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I ARTICLES I
Money Laundering and Wire Transfers:
When the New Regulations Take
Effect Will They Help?
Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr.*
I. Introduction
World stability is increasingly threatened by sophisticated
criminal organizations and their creative implementation of money
laundering schemes. Potentially, one of the most harmful effects
of money laundering by these highly skilled organizations is the
worldwide undermining of financial institutions - both banks and
non-banks, alike. In order to gain much needed hard currency,
some nations encourage money laundering. Most of the industrial
countries of the world, however, fight back by utilizing a three
prong attack: 1) treaties and conventions; 2) police-government
cooperation; and 3) domestic tightening of money controls
combined with relaxed bank secrecy restrictions.
The United States implements the three prong attack. Not all
prongs of the United States approach are equally efficient. In
scrutinizing the bank control prong, one is almost stymied by the
blizzard of proposed or actual regulations accompanying legislation.
* S.T. Dell Research Scholar and Professor of Law; Director, The Centre for
International Financial Crimes Studies, CGR College of Law. I wish to
acknowledge the excellent assistance of Ms. Suzanne Gilbert, third-year law
student, during the preparation of this work.
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Consequently, even though the bank controls are designed to take
the profit out of crime, there is concern that the regulations
negatively impact the efficiency of banking without effectively
restraining laundering activities. The fact is, it will take greater
understanding on the part of the upper-echelon United States
legislative and executive branch officers if they intend to provide
anything more than just minimal support for national as well as
transnational bankers attempting to, in good faith, assist in the fight
against organized financial criminals.
The other two prongs appear to be the more successful
weapons for law enforcement, particularly the various civil and
criminal forfeiture programs.1 In recent years a pattern of modest
enforcement success has emerged transnationally.2 These successes
can be attributed to both cooperation among field agents in
forfeitures and the aggressive implementation of mutual legal
assistance treaties, not to mention a generous asset-sharing
program.
Since 1986 the Office of International Affairs with the
assistance of foreign law enforcement and the Asset Forfeiture
Office of the Department of Justice have utilized forfeiture to
freeze and seize illicit assets in foreign jurisdictions.' This proce-
dure not only aids domestic crime prevention, it enhances coopera-
tive international crime detection. The vigor with which the United
States moves to force forfeiture of foreign or domestic funds has
been fueled by a desire to take the profit out of crime. An
additional governmental goal is to increase the amount of forfeited
funds in order to utilize the profits in the fight against national and
transnational crime.' In effect, law enforcement is putting the
forfeited ill-gotten gain to work against the very criminals from
1. Civil forfeiture programs are now under constitutional attack. The Double
Jeopardy Clause being the primary weapon for challenge; see United States v.
$405,089.13 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted; United
States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 762 (Jan. 12,
1996).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
STRATEGY REPORT 465-495 (Mar. 1991) [hereinafter NARCOTICS CONTROL
REPORT].
3. Id. at 1-7. See also World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transna-
tional Crime, U.N. ESCOR, Agenda Item 8, at 1-12, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.88/2 (1994)
[hereinafter World Ministerial Conference].
4. NARCOTICS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 2, at 45-54.
MONEY LAUNDERING AND WIRE TRANSFERS
whom the funds were forfeited in the first place. Essentially,
forfeiture has now become a somewhat modest "use tax." 5
At least one federal agency now sets its budget with an eye
toward the expected amount of forfeited revenue 6 because the
revenue, or up to 50 percent of it, remains within the office of the
"case" agency? When the forfeiture involves foreign police
cooperation, foreign agencies receive an equitable share.8
The extent of the United States government's financial stake
in forfeiture is apparent. In a 1990 memo the Attorney General
urged United States attorneys to increase the volume of forfeitures
in order to meet the Department of Justice's annual budget target:
We must significantly increase production to reach our budget
target. Failure to achieve the $470 million projection would
expose the Department's forfeiture program to criticism and
undermine confidence in our budget projections. Every effort
must be made to increase forfeiture income during the remain-
ing three months of [fiscal year] 1990.'
A troubling feature of the forfeiture program is the fact that there
is little or no legislative oversight."°
The United States is certainly one of the leading money
laundering nations in the world despite its continued enactment of
regulation upon regulation to curb the illicit trade of "dirty mon-
ey."'" At the 1988 White House Conference for a Drug Free
America, former President Ronald Reagan estimated that over 170
billion dollars of organized economic crime money is churned every
year in the United States." Estimates of the amount of illicit
5. William B. Pollard, Federal Asset Forfeiture Law in Money Laundering,
Asset Forfeiture and White Collar Crime 123 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file at the Centre for Int'l Financial Crimes Studies, Univ. of Florida).
6. Id.; see also United States v. Good, 114 S.Ct. 492, 502 n.2 (1993).
7. Pollard, supra note 5, at 124.
8. NARCOTICS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
9. Good, 114 S.Ct. 492.
10. Pollard, supra note 5, at 124.
11. See CLAIRE STERLING, THIEVES-WORLD 229-243 (1994). See also F.
Baldwin, The United States and International Cooperation:Are There Constitutional
Flaws? in FLETCHER N. BALDWIN & ROBERT J. MUNRO, 1 MONEY LAUNDER-
ING, ASSET FORFEITURE & INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRIMES (1994)
[hereinafter BALDWIN & MUNRO]; Raphael Francis Perl, The United States in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON DRUG CONTROL 67-68 (Scott B. MacDonald &
Bruce Zagaris ed., 1992).
12. Barry A.K. Rider, Organized Economic Crime 8 (July 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Tulane University Law School); see also ROWAN
BOSWORTH-DAVIES & GRAHAM SALTMARSH, MONEY LAUNDERING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE NEW LEGISLATION 201-204 (1994); DECLARATION OF
1996]
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money circulating worldwide indicate that organized criminal
activity jumped to an annual global trade in drugs alone of between
$200 billion to $500 billion annually. 3 Other nations proffer
equally dramatic estimates of illicit funds generated within their
borders.' 4 Illicit money breeds corruption. For example, several
years ago one private Japanese concern reported that ninety-eight
percent of all Japanese public companies listed on the three largest
securities exchanges made payments to organized crime groups.1 5
Money also translates into political power.
Be warned, however, that such statistics cannot be relied on to
make meaningful numerical comparisons. Most crime funds are
hard to detect; and crime bosses are unwilling to report their
massive financial empires. Indeed, accuracy in describing the size
of international crime may be irrelevant. What can be gained from
these varying figures is that they are of immense proportions.
Ultimately, the numbers indicate that worldwide economic crime
is a thriving growth industry of epic proportions that threatens the
very political existence of the vulnerable nation-state.
Economic crime does not end with predicate crimes such as
extortion, pornography, narcotics sales, or arms smuggling. The
"dirty" money associated with illicit activity must be "cleaned" so
that the funds can be openly transported and then spent in the
world marketplace. For example, it was reported that the late
Pablo Escobar of the Medellin cartel had $400 million in drug
revenues literally rot in the basement of a Los Angles home
because he could not disassociate the currency from the narcotics
trade.' 6 The criminals' need to utilize the proceeds of their activity
has spawned the industry of money laundering 7 and the concomi-
tant efforts by law enforcement to prevent the laundering of illegal
funds."
A NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN NARCOTICS TRAFFICK-
ERS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. 104-
129 (1995).
13. World Ministerial Conference, supra note 3, at 8.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7.
16. See Douglas Frantz, Tidal Wave of Dirty Drug Dollars, L.A, TIMES, June
26, 1991, at 1.
17. A recent report by the seven leading industrialized nations estimates that
leading drug dealers in the United States and Europe earn $232,155 a minute.
18. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1994) (statement of Margaret Milner Richardson, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue). In FY 1993, 2,147 money laundering investigations were initiated by
the IRS Examination Division, which is responsible for some of the enforcement
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Simply put, money laundering is the process whereby illegally
derived proceeds take on the appearance of legitimacy through the
comingling of the illicit proceeds with otherwise legitimate funds.1 9
The success or failure of the laundering process often turns upon
whether the launderer has been able to minimize, if not completely
eliminate, the creation of an evidentiary paper trail that would
facilitate law enforcement efforts tracing laundered proceeds back
to their illegal source.2' Therefore, the concealment of the pro-
ceeds' illegal source is often accomplished through the creation of
an intricate web of financial transactions in legitimate financial
institutions.21
According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report of 1995, money laundering schemes have become danger-
ously "internationalized" by a financial system that has no
geographic horizons, operates around the clock in every time zone,
and maintains one of the faster paces on the electronic highway.
22
For example, launderers have been able to create intricate and
almost untraceable series of financial transactions through the
utilization of wire transfers.23
The wire transfer has emerged as a major weapon at the
disposal of the launderer. Furthermore, it clear is that the current
system of wire transference enables launderers to access United
States financial institutions and then, through domestic and interna-
tional wire transfers, instantaneously move the proceeds of illegal
activity from account to account, within and among international
financial institutions. For this reason, wire transfers "have emerged
as the primary method by which high-volume money launderers ply
their trade."'24 There is little doubt that as complex as the subject
matter is, wire transfer recordkeeping requirements nevertheless
responsibilities under the Bank Secrecy Act - 34% of the total investigations
initiated. See also Federal Government Response to Money Laundering, Hearings
before the House Committee on Banking, Financial and Urban Affairs, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
19. See BALDWIN & MUNRO, supra note 11, at 3.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 4.
22. NARCOTICS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 2, at 481.
23. See Gerard Wyrsch, Treasury Regulation of International Wire Transfer and
Money Laundering: A Case for a Permanent Moratorium, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 515 (1992).
24. Id. at 522 (quoting in part Rebecca Cox, New Path for Money Laundering,
THE AM. BANKER, July 24, 1989, at 9 (letter from Donald G. Ogilvie, Executive
Vice President American Bankers Association to William J. Bennett ("Drug Czar"
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy))).
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are needed to assist law enforcement authorities with the difficult
task of unraveling the launderers' intricate web and tracing the
laundered proceeds back to their illegal sources. Those require-
ments have now been promulgated through regulations. This
article will analyze 1) the necessity for the new regulations and
2)the complexity of those regulations.
II. The Economic Criminals And Their Industry
What is the economic crime industry? Of what does it consist?
The activities which make up economic crime are as, broad as the
expression itself. The industry comprises all notions of Mafia, drug
dealers, or any organized criminal activity involving the funneling
of money out of legitimate hands into criminal hands within the
economic crime umbrella. The common characteristic of economic
criminals is the desire to conceal their ill gotten gains. To do this
the economic criminals must transfer funds, or launder money,
through various jurisdictions. This is done in such a fashion that
the money is at least untraceable, if not undiscovered by the
authorities.
All economic criminals, though diverse in their criminal
activity, must launder the proceeds of their illegal activity. It is the
cleaning of dirty money that keeps organized criminal activity alive
and allows criminal organizations entry into the legitimate business
world. By enabling the criminals to retain and use the profits of
their illegal activity, money laundering makes crime profitable.
Therefore, it is the practice of money laundering or cleaning which
keeps organized criminal activity alive.
25
Laundering the proceeds of illegal activity involves a five step
process: consolidation, externalization, agitation, legitimization, and
repatriation.26 By way of illustration, consider the following. A
25. As a prime example of organized crime's ability to style itself after big
business and use current profits to fund future criminal activity, it is not necessary
to look further than the Colombian cartels. After realizing that the United States
cocaine market was reaching a saturation point, the cartels invested tremendous
amounts of resources to begin cultivating approximately 70,000 acres of opium.
For a detailed explanation, see generally, The Crisis of Governance: Present and
Future Challenges: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and
International Operations, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 103rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1994) (statement of Dr. William J. Olson). See also Western Hemisphere
Drug Control Strategy, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 74 (1995).
26. Barry A.K. Rider, Lecture at Clare College, Cambridge University (July
1992). See also JEFFREY ROBINSON, THE LAUNDREYMEN (1995).
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person is involved in the activities of organized crime. The
particular crime family profits from "organized crime activities."
Because these illicit profits are collected in small dollar denomina-
tions, it is impossible to use these funds without raising the
suspicion of law enforcement or being reported under statutes
governing cash transactions. Hence, the money must be laundered.
The initial step in the laundering process is the collection of all
of the illegal money. This is defined by Barry Rider and Jeffrey
Robinson as the consolidation process. Second, the funds must be
transferred, for example, to a bank, from which they are then wire
transferred out of the United States. This is called the externaliz-
ing of funds. Externalizing can be accomplished, for example, via
a legitimate offshore Channel Islands bank. The cooperating
Channel Islands bank would house the funds in accounts in one of
its Guernsey or Jersey Central banks. The third step, termed
agitation, would involve the use of the funds in a series of transac-
tions that, for example, could be authorized by a New York law
firm. Various commercial transactions may then be made among
corporations in Delaware, Hong Kong, and Germany out of the
Central Bank accounts. These funds could eventually end up in a
London business entity. From London, the funds could be further
agitated through shell companies and then placed in various other
accounts. When this point is reached, the money is "legitimized."
This is the fourth step. The money can now be freely utilized
because it is associated with legitimate business and not illegal
activity. The final step in the cleansing process is the repatriation,
or return, of the funds to the country from which it originated. The
repatriation could be accomplished by incorporating dummy
companies in the United States and issuing worthless stock."
A. Legitimization of Economic Crime in Modern Society
The tragedy of economic crime and laundering methods, in
addition to undermining the political stability of a vulnerable
nation-state, is the manner in which it undermines the international
community, both overtly and subtly. Overtly, the impact is
reflected by news events of terrorist crimes, violence, and the
general feeling of a loss of security. The more subtle threat to
international stability and political morality by economic crime,
however, is not reflected in the evening world news.
27. The entire hypothesis comes from Professor Rider. See Rider, supra note
12, at 15. See also ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 11-16.
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Legitimization, once attained, makes it easy for economic
crime to proliferate. For example, one popular scheme is that of
the advance fee fraud. 8 The advance fee fraud involves duping
a victim by posing as a legitimate financial or business entity and
enticing the victim to invest sums of money without asking too
many questions.29 As ridiculous as it sounds for a person to invest
blindly, when cloaked in the guise of legitimacy, the advance fee
fraud can be quite successful. Typically, the operation consists of
a monied individual receiving a glossy, well prepared piece of
correspondence from a foreign conglomerate, replete with seals and
phony letters of reference, describing a unique, sure-hit, one-time
investment opportunity with mind-boggling returns. The communi-
cation flatters the recipient by making him feel part of an exclusive
opportunity with some very important world financiers. The ploy
often ends with the victim wiring funds to a secret foreign bank
account. The funds are never seen again; the investor is never
contacted. Apprehension of the fraudsters is often stymied by the
unwillingness of the humiliated victim to report the crime. 0
B. Is World-Wide Government Ill-Equipped To Effectively
Prosecute Economic Criminal Activity?
The public no longer believes that the system is capable of
bringing the perpetrators of serious fraud expeditiously and
effectively to book. The overwhelming weight of evidence laid
before us suggests that the public is right. The Roskill Commit-
tee on Fraud Trials, 1986. (UK) 31
Economic crime prospers because neither general understand-
ing, law enforcement, nor traditional roles between jurisdictions are
sophisticated enough to adequately address the problem of
economic crime. Economic crime and money laundering will
continue to thrive as long as public ignorance, criminal law, and
jurisdictional barriers exist, and economic crime, in the form of
paperless exchange, is considered outside of the conventional
notions of criminal activity.
28. See David D. Andelman, The Drug Money Maze, FOREIGN AFF.,
July/Aug. 1994, at 94.
29. Id.
30. Id. The example is all too familiar to law enforcement. See Sergeant Alan
Lambert, Detective, Financial Investigation Unit, Hertfordshire, U.K., Lecture (On
file, The Centre for Int'l Financial Crimes Studies, College of Law, Univ. of
Florida).
31. Id.
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Money laundering and economic crime is confusing to the
average individual because it is difficult for him to conceptualize
the millions, billions, or trillions of dollars involved. Additionally,
the nature of economic crime is sufficient for the general public to
lose interest. The crimes are paperless, leave no physical evidence,
and involve transactions and numbers. Of course, as soon as the
average citizen loses interest in such an activity, it is highly unlikely
that political leaders will appropriate the necessary resources and
interest to combat it. Apathy among the citizenry, legislature, and
judiciary is a major deterrent in fighting economic crime; the
urgency and impact of the problem is not understood.32
Perhaps the public's failure to understand economic crime is
related to the failure, in several areas, of criminal justice systems to
prosecute it. First, the standards of proof necessary for conviction
are often too high for seemingly invisible money laundering
activities. 33 Second, the slowness of police procedures prevents
laws enforcement from succeeding against the organized economic
criminal.34 In addition, the successful economic criminal is far
more likely to acquire sophisticated and influential legal advice, at
times, the government is unable to match the economic criminal's
fire power. Finally, it appears that any successful money launder-
ing scheme will use multiple jurisdictions to avoid prosecution, that
means that governments must learn to work together for a common
good.S
III. Attempts To Take The Profit Out Of Crime By Focusing
Upon Wire-Transfers
The demand for physical U.S. Currency is enormous. At the
end of 1994, U.S. currency in circulation totaled approximately
$405 billion.36 Of this amount, domestic holdings were about
$135 billion and foreign holdings $270 billion.37
32. Rider, supra note 12, at 17-18.
33. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994).
34. Barry A.K. Rider, Policing the International Securities Markets: An English
Perspective, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 194, 195 (1990).
35. Barry A.K. Rider & Anthony Shipman, Organized Crime International, in
DEFENCE ANNUAL REFERENCE BOOK 6 (United Kingdom, 1987).
36. Colloquy, Exploring the World of Cyberpayments: An Introductory Survey,
A Colloquium Sponsored by FinCEN, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Sept. 27, 1995,
at 6 (citing 81 FED. RESERVE BULL., Mar. 1995, at A5).
37. Id.
19961
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Wire transfers, also referred to as electronic funds transfers
(EFT), involve "a series of messages to and through one or more
banks that are intended to result in the payment of funds from one
person to another."3 The transfer is initiated when the person
sending the funds delivers a payment or transmittal order to his or
her bank;39 this can be accomplished in person, by telephone,
magnetic tape, computer terminal, telex, or written instructions.'
Before executing the transmittal order, the originator bank after
receiving it, will verify the authenticity of the order and reformat
it for transmission to either an intermediary or beneficiary bank.41
In cases involving multiple transfers through several intermedi-
ary banks, each receiving bank will reformat the transmittal order
received as necessary to communicate the requisite instructions to
the next bank in the chain.42 Intermediary banks strip off the
information that is not necessary to their stage of the transaction
in order to save electronic space.43 Generally, the information
contained in a reformatted transmittal order will be limited to that
which is relevant to the particular stage of the transfer." Such
information is likely to include: the identity of the originator, the
beneficiary, and the beneficiary's bank; the account number of the
originator and the beneficiary; the amount of the transfer; and
payment and routing instructions."
Actual payment of the transferred funds occurs when the
beneficiary bank accepts the transmittal order; the originator bank
electronically debits the originator's account; and the beneficiary
bank electronically credits the beneficiary's account.' The entire
transaction, which generally occurs on one of the primary electronic
funds communication systems, is effected through electronic
messages without physically transferring any cash.47 The primary
electronic communication systems include: the Federal Reserve
Communications System (Fedwire); the Clearing House Interbank
38. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 515.
39. Sarah J. Hughes, Policing Money Laundering Through Funds Transfers: A
Critique of Regulation Under the Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. LJ. 283, 290 (1992).
40. Id. at 290.
41. Id. at 291.
42. Id. at 292.
43. Wire Transfer Rules May Benefit From Medical Technology, 6 MoNEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Nov. 1994, at 3.
44. Hughes, supra note 39, at 292.
45. Id. at 292-93.
46. Id. at 288-94.
47. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 515.
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Payment System (CHIPS); and the Society for Worldwide Inter-
bank Financial Telecommunications S.C. (SWIFT).4" In 1995,
"[a]ccording to government figures, there [were] more than 110
million wire transfers per year, causing the movement of $474
trillion.,
49
A. Fedwire
. Fedwire, controlled and operated by the Federal Reserve
System since 1918, is the nation's primary wholesale electronic
funds transfer system connecting United States government
agencies, Federal Reserve member banking institutions, their
customers, and the twelve, regional Federal Reserve Banks.50
Transfers by Fedwire are initiated in-much the same way as other
electronic fund transfers, with the originator delivering a transmittal
order to a member bank.5 Upon receipt of the order, the origina-
tor bank verifies its authenticity and reformats it for transmission
to one of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks (FRB).52 At
the FRB, the order is processed, the beneficiary bank notified, and
the transfer settled through a series of debits and credits to the
appropriate Federal Reserve Bank accounts maintained by the
originator and beneficiary banks.53 Functioning as the exclusive
intermediary in Fedwire transfers, Federal Reserve banks serve as
clearing houses for transfers between member banks, their
customers and the Federal Reserve. 54
B. CHIPS
Created in 1970, the Clearing House Interbank Payment
System (CHIPS) is a private-sector system connecting the United
States with international banking institutions.5  Unlike the domes-
tic nature of Fedwire, CHIPS is the primary international electronic
funds transfer system in the United States.56 Regulatory authority
over CHIPS is vested in the Comptroller of the Currency, the
48. Id. at 517.
49. Wire Transfer Exemption, 5 DEP'T OF JUSTICE ALERT 10, Jan. 1995, at 8.
50. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 517-518.
51. Hughes, supra note 39, at 292.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 292-93.
54. Id. at 292.
55. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 519.
56. Id.
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Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. 7
Currently, there are approximately 140 domestic financial
institutions and branch offices of foreign banks participating in
CHIPS." In 1970, average daily CHIPS transfers exceeded $554
billion, with annual transfers approaching $140 trillion.5 9 Growing
at an annual rate of approximately 16.6%, 1990 CHIPS transfers
averaged approximately $222 trillion.' ° When considered in light
of the Fedwire transfers, these two EFT systems combine for an
average in excess of $1.2 trillion in annual daily transfers, or over
ninety-five percent of all wire transfers worldwide.6'
C SWIFT
Created in 1977, the SWIFT telecommunication system is
owned and operated by the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunications S.C., a Belgian cooperative society
comprised of approximately 1500 international financial institu-
tions.62 SWIFT is an international "automated message processing
and transmission service," which operates in conjunction with
Fedwire and CHIPS in facilitating international wire transfers. 63
Although it is not an electronic funds transfer system, nor subject
to United States federal regulation, SWIFT facilitates the transmis-
sion of fund transfers through Fedwire and CHIPS by processing
and transmitting relevant international financial information, such
as payment instructions, statements, and other related informa-
tion.' Connecting approximately 2400 institutions in approximate-
ly sixty countries worldwide, SWIFT processes an average of one
million electronic messages per day relating to Fedwire and CHIPS
transfers.65
D. Private Networks
In addition to Fedwire, CHIPS, and SWIFT, private electronic
fund transfer networks have surfaced. 66 These private networks
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 519.
61. Id. at 518-20.
62. Id. at 519-20.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 519-20.
66. Id. at 520.
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were developed by large money centers to assist the needs of their
customers, foreign branches, and correspondent operations. 67 As
a result of the American Bankers Association's compatibility
standards, most of these networks are fully compatible and
integrated with the Fedwire, CHIPS, and SWIFT systems.'
IV. Regulations: Past, Present, And Future
Beginning in 1970, the United States government officially
recognized the usefulness of evidentiary paper trails in its efforts to
combat money laundering by enacting the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA).69 Under the BSA, the government was able to impose
recordkeeping and reporting requirements upon certain financial
institutions involved in currency and monetary transactions exceed-
ing $10,000.70 The goal of the reporting requirements was to draw
law enforcement authorities' attention to highly suspicious financial
transactions at the inception of the laundering process.71 Since its
enactment in 1970, the BSA has been amended several times: The
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984;72 The Money Laun-
dering Control Act of 1986;7' The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988;74 and The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of
1992 (Annunzio-Wylie Act).75
In particular, the BSA requires certain financial institutions to
file currency transaction reports (CTRs) when engaged in currency
or monetary transactions in excess of amounts specified by the
Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary).76 In addition, the BSA
requires the reporting of suspicious transactions77 and the encour-
agement of "know your customer" policies. Upon conviction for
money laundering or CTR violations, 7 the BSA provides for the
termination of an institution's federal depository institution charter
or state depository institution insurance, as well as the elimination
of a responsible party's position in such an institution. Despite the
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970).
70. BALDWIN & MUNRO, supra note 11, at 7.
71. Id. at 8.
72. Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, Oct. 12, 1984.
73. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956-1957 (1988).
74. Pub. L. 100-690, Nov. 18, 1988.
75. Pub. L. No. 102-550 (1992) U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat. 3680).
76. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a).
77. 31 U.S.C. 5314.
78. 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1982); 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1987); 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1989);
12 U.S.C. § 1786 (1989).
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seemingly comprehensive nature of the BSA's anti-money launder-
ing provisions, none of the provisions go so far as to impose
recordkeeping or reporting requirements upon financial transac-
tions which do not involve the physical transfer of currency, that is,
transactions effectuated through the use of wire transfers.79
Launderers have used wire transfers to access United States
financial institutions and then use domestic and international wire
transfer systems to instantaneously move the proceeds of illegal
activity from account to account, within and among international
financial institutions.'0 The launderers may use the complexity
and speed of the wire transfer system to create an intricate and
almost untraceable web of financial transactions.81 Because of its
usefulness in concealing the origin of illicit funds, wire transfers
"have emerged as the primary method by which high-volume
money launderers ply their trade."' Thus, wire transfer record-
keeping requirements are needed to assist law enforcement
authorities with their difficult task of unraveling the launderers'
intricate web and tracing the laundered proceeds to their illegal
sources.
On December 23, 1992, the Federal Reserve Board (Board),
upon the recommendation of the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, issued a press release announcing that the
Board had adopted a policy statement for addressing the problem
of money laundering through wire transfer systems. 83 Recognizing
law enforcement's growing interest in identifying and prosecuting
money laundering activities, domestically as well as abroad, the
Board encouraged financial institutions engaging in funds transfers
through Fedwire, CHIPS and SWIFT, to the extent practical, to
assist law enforcement efforts by including complete originator and
beneficiary information in fund transmittal orders.'
79. BALDWIN & MUNRO, supra note 11, at 13.
80. Wyrsch, supra note 23.
81. See id. at 515.
82. Id. at 522 (quoting in part Rebecca Cox, New Path for Money Laundering,
THE AM. BANKER, July 24, 1989, at 9 (letter from Donald G. Ogilvie, Executive
Vice President American Bankers Association to William J. Bennett ("Drug Czar"
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy))).
83. Sarah J. Hughes, Fed Breaks Ice on Wire Transfer Regs, 4 MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Jan. 1993, No. 4, at 8.
84. Federal Reserve Press Release, Dec. 23, 1992 (58 Fed. Reg. 14,400 (Mar.
17, 1993)); Hughes, supra note 83, at 8.
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A. Prior Attempts at Wire Transfer Regulations
On October 31, 1989, under the authority of the BSA, the
Department of Treasury issued an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking authority entitled the Bank Secrecy Act Regulatory
Applications to the Problem of Money Laundering Through
International Payments."5 In order to facilitate the identification
of the source, volume, and frequency of international funds
transfers, the advance notice proposed to increase recordkeeping
and reporting requirements for banks involved in such transfers.
86
In particular, the advance notice proposed to require all interna-
tional wire transfers to contain the name and account number of
persons qualifying as either a foreign originator or beneficiary to
the transaction. 7 The advance notice further proposed to require
banking institutions to verify the legitimacy of the originator or
beneficiary's business, to develop suspicious wire transfer profiles,
and to file suspicious wire transfer reports with the Department of
Treasury.8
On October 15, 1990, the Department of Treasury issued a
revised proposal entitled the Proposed Amendment to the Bank
Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping for Funds
Transfers by Banks and Transmittals of Funds by Other Financial
Institutions. 9 The revised proposal sought to expand the reach of
the 1989 proposal, so as to cover domestic as well as international
wire transfers,' and to standardize otherwise inconsistent record-
keeping requirements.91
In April, 1992, after receiving over four hundred comments
and facing almost unanimous opposition from some 40,000
institutions estimated to be affected by the revised proposal, the
Department of Treasury decided not to further pursue the propos-
85. 54 Fed. Reg. 45,769 (Oct. 31, 1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. part 103);
Hughes, supra note 39, at 284 (Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified
as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)).
86. Hughes, supra note 39, at 284, 297.
87. Foes of Wire Regs Included in Dragnet, 1 MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT,
May 1990, No. 8, at 2.
88. Id. at 2.
89. 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (Oct. 15, 1990) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. part 103);
Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 520.
90. Hughes, supra note 39, at 284.
91. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 530. Non-bank institutions subject to these
proposed regulations would include telegraph offices, travel agencies, and check
cashing companies.
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al.92 Bankers asserted that the proposal was a reflection of the
Department of Treasury's "poor understanding of the nature and
complexities of international wire transfers and what can realistical-
ly be achieved through regulations intended to identify money-
laundering activities."93  The bankers further questioned the
usefulness of many of the proposed recordkeeping requirements as
the government already had access to a significant portion of the
information required under the proposal.94
Critics warned that the regulatory burden of the proposed
recordkeeping and reporting requirements would significantly
outweigh the benefits. In particular, they warned that such require-
ments would seriously impair the wire transfer systems' speed and
efficiency, thereby making the United States banks less competi-
tive.95  Some argued that a minimum-monetary threshold for
triggering the recordkeeping and reporting requirements was
justified in light of the high probability that launderers would not
attempt to launder millions of dollars in small increments.96 In a
recent article,97 Sarah Hughes, a Professor of Bank Regulation
and Commercial Law9 concluded that "the proposed recordkeep-
ing requirements would impose significant additional costs on
financial institutions and other wire transfer industry members
without yielding information that would be highly useful in law
enforcement proceedings. 99
The Bankers Association for Foreign Trade (BAFF) estimates
that the proposed recordkeeping and reporting requirements would
cost financial institutions in excess of $100 million dollars due to
92. Tough Money-Laundering Bill Awaits President's Signature, 2 THE REG.
COMPLI. WATCH, (1992) at 1 [hereinafter Money Laundering Bill]; Wyrsch, supra
note 23, at 529-30.
93. Money Laundering Bill, supra note 92, at 1; Bankers Prepare for Final
Treasury Rule on Fedwire, CHIPS Transaction Reporting, 2 THE REG. COMPLI.
WATCH, (1992) at 3 [hereinafter CHIPS Transaction Reporting].
94. CHIPS Transaction Reporting, supra note 93, at 3; Wyrsch, supra note 23,
at 530.
95. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 530.
96. Id. at 532.
97. Hughes, supra note 39.
98. Sarah Hughes, Treasury, Fed Close to the Wire on Wire Transfer Regs, 4
MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, (1993) at 5.
99. Hughes, supra note 39, at 299 (stating The Bank Secrecy Act authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations to provide information on
wire transfers that would have a 'high degree of utility' in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114
(1970)).
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compliance costs and lost revenue." The BAFT further warned
that such requirements would cause United States institutions to
suffer a significant competitive disadvantage with respect to foreign
competition."°  The American Bankers Association (ABA)
agrees with the BAFT that compliance costs coupled with a less
efficient wire transfer network would hurt the United States' ability
to compete internationally.1" However, the ABA anticipated
that the compliance costs triggered by the revised proposal would
approach $120 million, a figure significantly greater than that
estimated by BAFTF. °
The ABA viewed the revised proposal as a costly and
ineffective anti-money laundering initiative. °4 Of particular
concern to the ABA was the likelihood that launderers would
circumvent the recordkeeping and reporting requirements "by
providing erroneous and unverifiable information."1 5 The ABA
further criticized the untimeliness of the costly proposal, citing the
declining profitability of the banking industry coupled with
increased compliance costs triggered by other BSA initiatives. °6
The Federal Reserve agreed with many of the concerns
expressed by the BAFT and the ABA."° Although it acknowl-
edged that wire transfer recordkeeping requirements could be an
effective tool in fighting money laundering, the Federal Reserve
insisted that less burdensome and costly alternatives to the
proposed regulation existed:
the amendment would impose very substantial costs on banks
handling funds transfers; however, Treasury has not demonstrat-
ed that the particular elements of the proposal that are likely to
impose the greatest costs on banks will yield commensurate
benefits in terms of improved ability to investigate money
laundering activities. . . . The Board believes that simplified
and less costly recordkeeping requirements could be established
that would provide adequate information on funds transfers for
100. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 530-531.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 531.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Wyrsch, supra note 23, at 530.
106. Id. at 531.
107. Id. at 533.
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those law enforcement purposes for which the records will most
likely be used.1°8
Another line of criticism focused on the relatively insignificant
portion of all wire transfers which represent laundering transac-
tions.1 9 J. P. Morgan, a leading provider of payment and clearing
services, claimed that its company processed in any given day "a
dollar volume of legitimate funds transfers greater than the annual
cash proceeds of illegal drug dealing in the United States."1 '
Citicorp compared the "task of finding a money-laundering transfer
[through a wire transfer network] to searching for tainted dollars
that mathematically represent a grain of sand in the Sahara." '
Other critics have argued that certain categories of wire transfers,
such as those involving high or low denominations, and those
originated by regulated companies, are unlikely to be used for
money laundering."' "Although the Treasury did not ultimately
adopt th[e] proposed rule, it did consider the comments received
on the 1990 proposal when it drafted the proposed Recordkeeping
Rule and the Travel Rule jointly with the Federal Reserve in
1993. '' 1
After several failed attempts by the Department of Trea-
sury,"4 the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
System (Federal Reserve), pursuant to the authority prescribed in
the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992 (Annun-
zio-Wylie), 5 jointly proposed enhanced recordkeeping require-
ments relating to domestic and international wire transfers by
108. Id. at 533-34 (quoting letter from William Wiles, Secretary of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to Peter K. Nunez, Assistant
Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Jan. 25, 1991 (comment letter)).
109. Hughes, supra note 39, at 308-09.
110. Id. at 308 (quoting Comment Letter from Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York to the Department of the Treasury (Feb. 5, 1991)).
111. Id. at 308 (quoting Comment Letter from Citicorp to the Department of
the Treasury 3, 9 (Jan. 15, 1991)).
112. Id. at 309.
113. Robert G. Ballen et al., Electronic Payments: The New Recordkeeping
Regulations, 112 BANKING LJ. 786 (1995).
114. Bank Secrecy Act Regulatory Applications to the Problems of Money
Laundering Through International Payments, 54 Fed. Reg. 45,769 (1989) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. part 103); Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act
Regulating to Recordkeeping for Funds Transfers by Banks and Transmittals of
Funds by other financial Institutions, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (1990) (to be codified
at 31 C.F.R. part 103).
115. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550
(1992) U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat. 3680); see also Ballen et. al., supra note 113.
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certain financial institutions on August 31, 1993.116 Additionally,
on the same day, the Treasury issued the proposed Travel
Rule.117 With comments due on October 4, 1993 and the interna-
tional wire transfer recordkeeping requirements required by statute
to be in effect prior to January 1, 1994, the Secretary and the Board
proposed to make the domestic and international wire transfer
recordkeeping requirements effective as of December 31, 1993.1
Shortly after the effective date was published, the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve announced that the final proposed rules would
not be made available until some time later in 1994.119 For nearly
two years the Federal Reserve and the Treasury sought comments
-from affected financial institutions12 Responding to those com-
ments by amending the proposed rules, the Federal Reserve and
the Treasury issued the final Recordkeeping Rule and Travel Rule
in early 1995.121 Optimistically, it was announced that these final
rules would become effective on January 1, 1996."2 However,
that date has been pushed back to April 1, 1996.1 "Given the
severe penalties that can result from violations of these rules, it is
imperative that bank and nonbank financial institutions are fully
aware of the rules, and are prepared to be in full compliance by
their effective date."124
The new Recordkeeping Rule and Travel Rule are found at 31
CFR §§ 103 et seq. In addition, the jointly adopted final regula-
tions can be found in the Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act
Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping for Funds by Financial
Institutions at 60 Fed. Reg. 220 (1995) and Recordkeeping
Requirements for Certain Financial Records at 60 Fed. Reg. 231
(1995).
116. Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to
Recordkeeping for Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds by Financial
Institutions Part IV, 58 Fed. Reg. 46,014 (1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. part
103).
117. Ballen et al., supra note 113, at 786.
118. Reimbursement for Providing Financial Records; Recordkeeping Require-
ments for certain Financial Records, 58 Fed. Reg. 46,024 (1993) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. part 219, subpart B); 58 Fed. Reg. 46,014 (1993) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. part 103).
119. Ballen et al., supra note 113, at 788.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 786.
123. Wire Rules Amended; Now Effective April 1, 6 MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, (1995), at 1 [hereinafter Wire Rules].
124. Ballen et al., supra note 113, at 786-787.
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V. Requirements Of The New Regulations Governing
Suspicious Transactions
On January 3, 1995, the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN) of the Treasury and the Board jointly an-
nounced another round of transfer regulations as an amendment to
The Bank Secrecy Regulations codified in 31 CFR Part 103.1"5
The final rules, with an effective date of January 1, 1996, which has
now been pushed back to April 1, 1996,1" require each domestic
financial institution involved in a wire transfer to collect and retain
certain information for a period of five years.127 The amount and
type of the information would depend upon the type of financial
institution, its role in the particular wire transfer, and the relation-
ship of the parties to the transaction with the financial institu-
tion."'
This information is intended to facilitate law enforcement
efforts in tracing, identifying, and prosecuting persons engaged in
money laundering activities. 29 The Secretary and the Board
believe that "maintenance of these records will have a high degree
of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations of money
laundering operations without having a significant adverse effect on
either the cost or the efficiency of wire transfer systems opera-
tions. ,131 In addition to Treasury, the new regulations have been
supported by various agencies, the Department of Justice, the
Internal revenue Service, and the Office of the Chief Postal
Inspector.1 31  These government agencies commented that the
additional information gathered by the regulations will be of great
assistance in counteracting money laundering activities.132 In fact,
there have been suggestions that the rules be strengthened. 33
"The Recordkeeping Rule (Rule) applies to both bank and
nonbank (such as broker-dealers and money transmitters) financial
125. Id.
126. Wire Rules, supra note 123, at 1.
127. Ballen et al., supra note 113, at 796.
128. Id.
129. 58 Fed. Reg. at 46,015 (1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. part 103).
130. Id.
131. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act regulations Relating to Recordkeep-
ing for Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds by Financial Institutions, 60
Fed. Reg. 220 (1995).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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institutions."" After reviewing the comments received, FinCEN
and the Federal Reserve rejected the suggestion that the rule
provide for a small institution exemption.'35 In arriving at this
decision, the regulators concluded "that such an exemption would
permit money laundering operations to evade the recordkeeping
requirements of this new rule by directing their illegal operations
through small institutions."'3 6
The Rule is one of general applicability to any "payment
order" which is the first in a series of transactions comprising the
funds transfer. 37 While a payment order is typically an oral,
electronic, or written instruction, that instruction must have three
characteristics to be deemed a payment order under the Rule. 38
First, the instruction may not include a condition to payment,
though a time condition would be permitted.1 39 Second, payment
must be made to the receiving bank by the sender either through
the debit of the sender's account or the payment directly to the
beneficiary bank."4 Finally, the instructions must be transmitted
directly to the beneficiary. 4' "As a general matter, payment
orders sent through Fedwire, the Clearinghouse Interbank
Payments System (CHIPS), and the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) are payment
orders subject to the Recordkeeping Rule. '" 142
Interestingly, the Rule allows for the exemption of transfers
covered by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978.4" Addi-
tionally, specifically excluded are transfers made through automated
teller machines, point of sale systems, and automated clearinghous-
es.1" No justification was given for the exclusion of such trans-
fers. The result of the exemption is that a transfer through an ATM
terminal is automatically exempt without regard to the identity of
the originator.
Motivated by the comments received by Treasury, the final
rule exempts wire transfers below $3,000.145 This threshold was
134. Ballen et al., supra note 113, at 788-789.
135. Id. at 789.
136. Id. (citing 60 Fed. Reg. at 227 (1995)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Ballen et al., supra note 113, at 789.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 790.
143. Id.
144. Ballen et al., supra note 113, at 790.
145. Id. at 791; 60 Fed. Reg. at 223 (1995).
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selected by surveying Fedwire and finding that 22% of transactions
in a sample day were for amounts less than $3,000, while 36% were
for less than $10,000.!4  Banks are expected to notify law en-
forcement when a person sends multiple small dollar transfers to
circumvent the threshold requirement.147 This "structuring" will
engender the presumption that the transfers are intended to
circumvent the Rule. Other modifications limit instances where
verification is required."4  These exemptions have been imple-
mented in an attempt to strike a balance between the needs of law
enforcement and the burden placed on financial institutions
required to comply with the regulations.149  Even though the
exemptions cannot prevent launderers from using the wire
transference system, the regulations will help trace the proceeds of
the illegal activity and identify the participants in money laundering
schemes.150
The definitions in the new regulations are familiar to those
familiar with Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code.15'
They parallel those found in Article 4A, such as transmitter,
transmitter's financial institution, etc.'52 The Official Comment
to UCC 4A is helpful in understanding many of the definitions
adopted in the final rule.53 Terms used in the regulations that
are not defined have the meaning given to them in the UCC unless
otherwise indicated in the rule.154
A. Established Customers
A significant term in the Joint Rule is that of "established
customer." '55 Established customers are defined as persons with
an account with the financial institution, or persons on whom the
financial institution maintains files including the customers' name,
address, and the customer's taxpayer identification number. 56
Examples of established customer accounts include deposit
146. 60 Fed. Reg. at 223 (1995).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 223.
149. Id.
150. 60 Fed. Reg. at 223 (1995).
151. Id. at 221.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 60 Fed. Reg. at 221 (1995).
155. Id. at 222.
156. Id. at 222.
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accounts, loan agreements, trust accounts, custody accounts, and
mutual fund accounts. 157
The final rule requires that if a payment order is from an
originator other than an established customer and is made in
person, the originator's bank shall verify the identity of the person
placing the payment order. 5 8 It is noteworthy because additional
requirements are imposed for persons who are not established
customers of the financial institution subject to the Joint Rule.159
If it accepts the payment order, the originator's bank shall obtain
and retain a record of the person's name and address, the type of
identification reviewed, the number of the identification document,
as well as the taxpayer identification number (social security or
employer identification number) or, if none, the person's alien
identification number, or passport number and country of issu-
ance.16 For payment of proceeds of a funds transfer in person
to a beneficiary bank to a beneficiary who does not have a deposit
or loan account, the beneficiary's bank shall verify the identity of
the person receiving proceeds and shall obtain and retain informa-
tion similar to that required to be retained by originator's banks for
originators who are not established customers.' Ultimately, the
final rule has been clarified to require that the identity of an
originator or beneficiary that is not an established customer be
verified by examination of a document, preferably one that contains
the person's name, address, and photograph. 62
B. Originator Bank Requirements
The originator's bank will be required to maintain the
following information for each payment order that it accepts of
$3,000 or more:
(A) originator's name and address;
(B) amount of the wire transfer
(C) date of the payment order;
(D) any payment instructions received from the originator;
(E) identity of the beneficiary's bank;
157. Id.
158. 60 Fed. Reg. at 224 (1995).
159. Id. at 224.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 224.
162. Id. at 225.
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(F) name, address, account number and any other specific
identifier of the beneficiary if received with the payment
order.16'
Additionally, the originator's bank must retain all payment
instructions received with the order.1" Payment instructions may
include the purpose of the funds transfer, directions to the
beneficiary's bank regarding how to notify the beneficiary of the
receipt of the funds, or other information.1" Combined with
these requirements, the originator's bank may face three possible
scenarios if the originator is not an established customer.
First, if the payment order is made in person, the bank will be
required to verify the identity of the person placing the order and
record that person's name, address, identification and taxpayer
identification number, alien identification number or passport
number, or note the lack of such a number."6
Second, if the originator's bank has knowledge that the person
placing the payment order is not the originator, the bank would be
required to record the originator's tax identification number, or if
not, alien identification number or passport number, or note the
lack thereof.6 7
Third, if the payment order is not made in person, the bank
will obtain and retain a record of the name and address of the
person placing the payment order, as well as the person's taxpayer
identification number, or if none, alien identification number,
passport number, or a notation in the record of the lack of such
information, and a copy or a record of the method of payment."
The final rule requires that the originator's bank retain as
many of the means of identification of the beneficiary as are
received with the payment order.169 To fulfill this requirement,
originator banks are encouraged to request that originators provide
complete beneficiary information when possible. 7
163. Id. at 229.
164. 60 Fed. Reg. at 224 (1995).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. ld.
169. 60 Fed. Reg. at 223 (1995).
170. Id.
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C. Beneficiary Bank Requirements
A beneficiary bank will have to retain the original or a copy
of each payment order it accepts. 171 If the beneficiary is not an
established customer of the beneficiary's bank and the proceeds are
delivered in person, then the beneficiary's bank also will be
required to verify that person's identity and record his or her name
and address, the identification and social security number, alien
registration number or passport number, or note the lack of such
information.172 If the proceeds are not delivered in person, the
beneficiary's bank must retain a copy or record of the check or
other instrument used to effect payment and the name and address
of the person to whom it was sent.' 73
D. Non-Bank Financial Institution Requirements
Brokers and dealers in securities and other non-bank financial
institutions are required to obtain and retain information similar to
that required of financial institutions. 74 In addition to that
information, a transmitter's financial institution other than a bank
must keep the original or a copy for five years of any form that is
completed or signed by the person placing the transmittal or-
der."7 5 A recipient's financial institution other than a bank must
keep any form completed or signed by the recipient.
Non-bank financial institutions, under previous versions of the
rule, would have been required to retain records of the identities
of all originators. 76 The final rule exempts NBFIs from collecting
information on originators/transmitter or beneficiaries/recipients if
they are "established customers.""
E. Compliance Exceptions
Treasury and the Board stated that they understand that some
banks, particularly those that send payment orders electronically,
may rely on the records of the payment orders they execute,
supplemented by the originator name and address information in
their customer information file, to meet the record keeping require-
171. Id. at 222.
172. Id. at 224.
173. Id. at 224-225.
174. 60 Fed. Reg. at 222 (1995).
175. Id. at 225.
176. Id. at 222.
177. Id.
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ments of this rule for established customers.178 The current Fed-
wire format does not have sufficient space to include all means
provided by the originator of identifying the beneficiary. The final
rule provides an exception to the requirement that the bank retain
as many means of identifying the beneficiary as provided by the
originator, until completion of the bank's conversion to the expand-
ed Fedwire format.179 For NBFIs, this temporary exemption is
limited to the domestic brokers and dealers in securities.
180
Treasury and the Board believe that only this category of NBFI is
likely to electronically send transmittals of funds that ultimately are
effected through Fedwire.181  The Treasury and Board will
monitor the experience of law enforcement and the industry under
the rule to determine whether law enforcement efforts are hindered
materially due to the lack of beneficiary information." If it is
determined that there is a material hindrance, Treasury and the
Board will consider mandating that beneficiary information to be
retained for all payment orders."8  Additionally, Treasury be-
lieves that suspicious transaction reports and anti-money laundering
policy and program rules due out for comment in 1995 should
materially reduce any attempts to take advantage of the fact that
there is no requirement to obtain beneficiary information."8
To eliminate redundancy in the proposed list of exemptions
and provide consistent treatment for wholly-owned domestic
subsidiaries of domestic banks and domestic brokers or dealers in
securities, the final rule has been revised to exempt transfers where
the originator and the beneficiary are any of the following:
(A) a domestic bank;
(B) a wholly-owned domestic subsidiary of a domestic bank;
(C) a domestic broker or dealer in securities;
(D) a wholly-owned subsidiary of a domestic bank;
(E) the United States;
(F) a state or local government; or
(G) a federal, state, or local government agency or instrumen-
tality.185
178. Id. at 223.
179. 60 Fed. Reg. at 223-224 (1995).
180. Id. at 224.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 60 Fed. Reg. at 226 (1995).
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The final rule exempts transfers where both the originator and
the beneficiary are the same person and the originator's bank and
the beneficiary's bank are the same domestic bank. 86 Likewise,
the exemption applies to transmittals of funds where both the
transmitter and the recipient are the same person and the transmit-
ter's financial institution and the recipient's financial institution are
the same domestic broker or dealer in securities."8 The rule also
exempts other fund transfers made through an automated clearing-
house, an ATM or a point-of-sale system.' s
Records under the rule pertain to records of transfers made on
or after January 1, 1996 and must be retained for a period of five
years."8 Brokers and dealers are exempted from this retention
requirement to the extent that they may continue to comply with
current Securities and Exchange Commission regulations.1"°
Treasury and the Board will monitor the effectiveness of the
retention requirement and determine at a later date if a longer
retention period, even if materially affecting the cost of compliance,
is necessary.191
F Stated Areas Of Potential Revision
Treasury and the Board will monitor the experience of law
enforcement and the industry under this rule for 36 months."9
If, at the end of this period, it is determined that law enforcement
efforts are materially hindered due to lack of beneficiary informa-
tion in the records retained under this rule, Treasury and the Board
will consider mandating that beneficiary information be retained for
all payment orders.' 93  Additionally, Treasury and the Board
expect that the suspicious transaction reporting and anti-money
laundering policy and program rules issued for comment by
Treasury in 1995 should materially reduce any wrongdoing
stemming from the fact that an originator's bank is not explicitly
required by this rule to obtain beneficiary information. 1"4
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 222.
189. Id. at 226-227.
190. Id. (Brokers and dealers subject to the Bank Secrecy Act must preserve
records according to 31 C.F.R. Part 103 if those periods are longer than those
required by the SEC under 17 C.F.R. 240.17a-8).
191. 60 Fed. Reg. 227 (1995).
192. Id. at 221.
193. Id. at 224.
194. Id. 60 Fed. Reg. 46556 (1995).
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The aim of FinCEN and the Federal Reserve is to create a
system by which banks may report suspicious transactions in a more
efficient manner.95 Under the new regulations, "banks will
report possible violations of law on the new Suspicious Activity
Report, or SAR."'196 The SAR replaces the previously-used CRF,
Criminal Referral Form.
Under the proposed regulations, banks will no longer check a
box on the Currency Transaction Report (CTR) indicating that a
transaction may be suspicious. 19 7 Rather, all suspicious activity,
whether or not a cash transaction, will be reported on the SAR.' 8
Additionally, the banks will only file one report with FinCEN,
rather than a number of reports to multiple agencies' 9 Because
FinCEN will be automated for easy access, those persons using
multiple institutions to facilitate laundering activities will be more
easily detected and tracked. The final alteration in bank reporting
addresses the "dollar threshold for reporting known or suspected
crimes, other than BSA and money laundering and/or insider
crimes."2 0
Treasury intends to offer final regulations that are "identical"
to those of FinCEN.2°' However, it appears that the regulations
of Treasury are, in actuality, broader than those of FinCEN.202
Due to the potential penalties that could be imposed upon a bank
failing to comply with the regulations, the broad regulations could
trigger a number of unnecessary reports and defeat the intended
goal of improved efficiency.
There are, however, a number of similar problems with both
sets of proposed regulations. First, under both proposals, banks will
195. Linda Noonan, Proposed SAR Regulations: What You Can Expect, MONEY
LAUNDERING REP., No. 5, Dec. 1995. The Treasury Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking was published on Sept. 7, 1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 46556. The regulators'
proposals are found as follows: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 60
Fed Reg. 34481 91995) (Proposed 1995); Comptroller of the Currency, 60 Fed.
Reg. 34476 (July 3, 1995); Office of Thrift Supervision, 60 Fed. Reg. 36366 (1995)
(proposed 1995); and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 60 Fed. Reg. 47719
(1995) (proposed 1995). Id. at n.1.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. Other agencies will be able to access the information through FinCEN
and all other documentation will remain with the bank as needed. Id.
200. Noonan, supra note 195, at n.1. "The threshold has been raised from
$1,000 to $5,000 for non-insider crimes, where the suspect has been identified, and
from $5,000 to $25,000 where the suspect cannot be identified." Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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be required to report attempted suspicious transactions, rather than
giving the banks the discretion to determine when an attempted
transaction is sufficiently suspicious.2°3  Second, there is the
potentiality of double penalties for banks in violation of the
reporting requirements.2 °4 Third, the regulations may not provide
enough time for a bank to complete an investigation into a
suspicious transaction. Fourth, there remains one final inefficiency.
If currency over $10,000 is involved, the bank will have the
obligation to file both a SAR and a CTR. °5 There is no justifi-
able reason to require a bank to file both forms.7
VI. Increased Detection Of Wire Transfers
The new wire transfer regulations taking effect this year are
designed to increase the production of information regarding
existing money laundering operations. They enable authorities "to
find and retrieve evidence on suspected money launderers, but will
offer no real help in detecting new money laundering opera-
tions. 2 °7  After all, by the time the safeguards of the current
regulations trigger the suspicion of law enforcement officials, the
money laundering operation is already in full swing. "Recently,
proposals on the use of artificial intelligence systems to detect
money laundering through wire transactions in the broader effort
to investigate drug trafficking, terrorism, espionage, and illegal arms
trade have begun to surface. '' 208  In September, the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) determined it would be nearly
impossible to develop a "fully automated computer screening of
wire transfers."2'
Today, FinCEN uses some artificial intelligence to aid in the
identification of money launderers. FinCEN analyzes a compilation
of data, including CTR's, to identify and monitor potentially illegal
patterns of behavior characteristic of money laundering.2 0 How-
ever, a survey of law enforcement agents by the OTA revealed that
the information provided by FinCEN is actually more useful in
building a case against money launderers than in the initial
203. Id.
204. Noonan, supra note 195, at n.1.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Holly R. Skolnick, Can Artificial Intelligence Be Used To Detect
Laundering, 6 MONEY LAUNDERING LAW REP., No.5, at 1, Dec. 1995.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 6.
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detection of them.211 While the monitoring of data obtained from
wire transactions would be more helpful than the current monitor-
ing of CTR's, there are four identifiable problems with such a use
of data: 1) illicit transfers mirror those which are legitimate; 2) very
little information is generated by a wire transfer; 3) scarce
resources would be consumed due to the inability to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate transfers; and 4) the unavoid-
able infringement on privacy.
212
The most important of these concerns is the potential infringe-
ment on the privacy of the bank customer. Questions have already
been raised as to the propriety of FinCEN's current practices of
piecing together data to determine an individual's financial
activities and patterns. 213 "The intrusion on privacy rights could
potentially be even broader and more indiscriminate given
admittedly blunt identification methods; for every money launderer
identified, thousands of law-abiding citizens would see their
financial privacy reduced., 214 Government would have increased
access to financial records of innocent persons whose transfers
mimic those of a money launderer. In addition, corporations which
may have a vested interest in keeping financial information
confidential would worry that information could be obtained by
competitors.215 While it remains unanswered whether these
tracking methods would violate the letter of the Right to Financial
Privacy Act,216 they appear to violate the spirit of that law. 217
In its report, OTA suggests that, before attempting to create
an artificial intelligence system monitoring data from wire transfers,
FinCEN be given "unilateral power to selectively gain 'rapid
access to wire transfer records' related to CTR's already identified
as suspicious. '218 In essence, this would be equivalent to giving
FinCEN an electronic subpoena with which FinCEN would have
"total and unregulated access to wire transfer information for
investigatory purposes." 219 By doing so, FinCEN could circum-
vent the usual methods and safeguards for obtaining such records,
thereby creating more questions about violating privacy rights.
211. Id.
212. Skolnick, supra note 207.
213. Id. at 7.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 12 U.S.C. § 3409 et seq.
217. Skolnick, supra note 207.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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VII. The Competing Interests Of Enabling Statutes And
Financial Privacy.
A. The Statutory Authority of the Bank Secrecy Act & the
Annunzio-Wylie Amendment
The wire transfer recordkeeping 2  and travel regulations22
were proposed under the authority of the BSA, as amended by the
Annunzio-Wylie Act.' z Under the BSA, the Secretary and the
Board jointly prescribe domestic wholesale fund transfer record-
keeping requirements for insured depository institutions whenever
they determine that the maintenance of such records will have a
"high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory invest-
igations."" The records must comport with the primary purpose
220. 58 Fed. Reg. 46,014 (1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed
Aug. 31, 1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 46,024 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 219,
subpart B) (proposed Aug. 31, 1993).
221. 58 Fed. Reg. 46,021 (1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed
Aug. 31, 1993).
222. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
Title XV of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992.
223. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (Title 12. Banks and Banking. Chapter 16. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation).
(a) Congressional findings and declaration of purpose.
(1) ...
(2) It is the purpose of this section to require the maintenance of
appropriate types of records by insured depository institutions in the
United States where such records have a high degree of usefulness
in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.
(b) Recordkeeping regulations.
(1) In general. Where the Secretary of the Treasury (referred to in
this section as the "Secretary") determines that the maintenance of
appropriate types of records or other evidence by insured depository
institutions has a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings, he shall prescribe regula-
tions to carry out the purposes of this section.
(2) Domestic funds transfers. Whenever the Secretary and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System hereafter in this
section referred to as the "Board") determine that the maintenance
of records, by insured depository institutions, of payment orders
which direct transfers of funds over wholesale funds transfer systems
has a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings, the Secretary and the Board shall
jointly prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this section
with respect to the maintenance of such records.
(3) International funds transfers.
(A) In general. The Secretary and the Board shall jointly
prescribe, after consultation with State banking supervisors,
final regulations requiring that insured, businesses that provide
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of the BSA, that being the identification of the source, volume, and
movement of funds.
224
check cashing services, money transmitting businesses, and
businesses that issuer or redeem money orders, travelers' checks
or other similar instruments maintain such records of payment
orders which -
(i) involve international transactions; and
(ii) direct transfers of funds over wholesale funds transfer
systems or on the books of any insured depository institu-
tion, or on the books of any business that provides check
cashing services, any money transmitting business, and any
business that issues or redeems money orders, travelers'
checks or similar instruments that will have a high degree
of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations
or proceedings.
(B) Factors for consideration. In prescribing the regulations
required under subparagraph (A), the Secretary and the Board
shall consider -
(i) the usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investiga-
tions or proceedings of any record required to be main-
tained pursuant to the proposed regulations; and
(ii) the effect the recordkeeping required pursuant to such
proposed regulations will have on the cost and efficiency of
the payment system.
(C) Availability of records. Any records required to be main-
tained pursuant to the regulations prescribed under subpara-
graph (A) shall be submitted or made available to the Secretary
or the Board upon request.
(c) Identity of persons having account and persons authorized to act
with respect to such accounts' exemptions. Subject to the requirements
of any regulations prescribed jointly be the Secretary and the Board
under paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (b), each insured depository
institutions shall maintain such records and other evidence, in such Form
as the Secretary shall require . ... The Secretary may make such
exemptions from any requirement otherwise imposed under this
subsection as are consistent with the purposes of this section.
(d) ...
(e) ...
(g) Retention period. Any type of record or evidence required under
this section shall be retained for such period as the Secretary may
prescribe for the type in question. Any period so prescribed shall not
exceed six years unless the Secretary determines, having regard for the
purposes of this section, that a longer period is necessary in the case of
a particular type of record or evidence.
(h)
(i) Application of provisions to foreign banks. The provisions of this
section shall not apply to any foreign bank except with respect to the
transactions and records of any insured branch of such a bank.
(j) Civil penalties....
224. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b.
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In addition to domestic wholesale fund transfer recordkeeping
requirements, the Secretary and the Board also jointly prescribe
international wholesale fund transfer recordkeeping requirements
having "a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations."2
These regulations, which were supposed to be in effect before
January 1, 1994,2' would be applicable to insured depository
institutions and businesses providing check cashing, money
transmitting, and other related services.2  Prescribing such
recordkeeping requirements, the Secretary and the Board prepared
a cost benefit analysis, balancing the perceived usefulness of
proposed regulatory requirements in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations against the perceived costs in which such regulations
would impose upon the wholesale fund transfer system.2'
12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) limits the period in which regulated
institutions may be required to retain records relating to domestic
and international wire transfers.229 While such records must be
kept for as long as the Secretary prescribes, in the absence of a
prior determination by the Secretary that a longer period is
required to satisfy the purposes of the statute, such period may not
exceed six years.
12 U.S.C. § 1953 further provides that the Secretary may
require any uninsured bank or financial institution to maintain
appropriate records for activities, such as domestic and internation-
al wire transfers, where the maintenance of the records has a "high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investiga-
tions.""1  The significance of this section is that it broadens the
225. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(3); (proposed Aug. 31, 1993) 58 Fed. Reg. 46,014
(1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
226. 58 Fed. Reg. 46,024 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 219, subpt. B)
(proposed Aug. 31, 1993).
227. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(3); 58 Fed. Reg. 46,014 (1993) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed Aug. 31, 1993).
228. Id.
229. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(g).
230. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(g) (Retention period. Any type of record or evidence
required under this section shall be retained for such period as the Secretary may
prescribe for the type in question. Any period so prescribed shall not exceed six
years unless the Secretary determines, having regard for the purposes of this
section, that a longer period is necessary in the case of a particular type of record
or evidence).
231. 12 U.S.C. § 1953 (Title 12. Banks and Banking. Chapter 21. Financial
Recordkeeping)
(a) Where the Secretary determines that the maintenance of the
appropriate records and procedures by any uninsured bank or uninsured
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Secretary's regulatory authority beyond that of insured banks.
Thus, the authority includes any financial institution defined in 31
U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2). 2
Finally, 31 U.S.C. § 5314 authorizes the Secretary to require
financial institutions to develop and participate in anti-money
laundering programs.1 3  At a minimum, the Secretary may
require such financial institutions to develop internal policies,
procedures and controls.' The Secretary's proposed travel
regulations are its first steps towards the implementation of this
provision.?"
institutions, or any person engaging in the business of carrying on in the
United States any of the functions referred to in subsection (b) of this
section, has a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings, he may by regulation require such bank,
institution, or person-
(1) to require, retain, or maintain, with respect to its functions as
an uninsured bank or uninsured institution or its function referred
to in subsection (b), any records or evidence of any type which the
Secretary is authorized under Section 21 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. 1829b] to required insured banks to
require, retain, or maintain; and
(2) to maintain procedures to assure compliance with requirements
imposed under this chapter [12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq.] ...
(b) Institutions subject to recordkeeping requirements. The authority of
the Secretary of the Treasury under subsection (a) extends to any
financial institution (as defined in 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States
Code), other than any insured bank (as defined in section 3(h) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. 1813(h)]) and any insured
institution (as defined in section 401(a) of the National Housing Act [12
U.S.C. 1724(a)]), and any partner, officer, director, or employee of any
such financial institution.
232. 12 U.S.C. § 1953.
233. The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, supra note 222, § 1517,
(h) Anti-Money Laundering Programs. -
(1) In General. -In order to guard against money laundering
through financial institutions, the Secretary may require financial
institutions to carry out anti-money laundering programs, including
at a minimum
(A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls,
(B) the designation of a compliance officer,
(C) an ongoing employee training program, and
(D) an independent audit functions to test programs.
(2) Regulations. -The Secretary may prescribe minimum standards for
programs established under paragraph (1).
234. 58 Fed. Reg. 46,021 (1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed
Aug. 31, 1993).
235. Id.
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B. The Limiting Effect of the Right to Financial Privacy Act on
Proposed Legislation
While finding its authority under the BSA, the proposed wire
transfer regulations236 must also comply with the Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act (RFPA).2 7 Under the RFPA, the government,
subject to exceptions,23' may not access a customer's financial
records unless the government reasonably describes the financial
records and satisfies at least one of five conditions: 1) the govern-
ment must acquire the customer's consent; 2) obtains an adminis-
trative subpoena or summons; 3) obtains search warrant; 4) obtains
judicial subpoena; or 5) makes a formal written request.239
There are currently at least fourteen exceptions to the RFPA
which, in addition to allowing government access to customers'
financial records, are applicable to the proposed wire transfer
regulations.'l These exceptions include: the limited access
exception;" the foreign intelligence and Secret Service protec-
tive function exception;242 the unidentified customer except-
ion;243 the supervisory agency's exception;2" the Internal Reve-
236. 58 Fed. Reg. 46,014 (1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed
Aug. 31, 1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 46,021 (1993) (to be codified at 31 G.F.R. pt. 103)
(proposed Aug. 31, 1993).
237. 12 U.S.C. § 3401, et seq. (12 U.S.C. 3402) Access to financial records by
Government authorities prohibited; exceptions.
Except as provided by ... (12 U.S.C. 3403(c), (d), 3413, 3414], no
Government authority may have access to or obtain copies of, or the
information contained in the financial records of any customer from a
financial institution unless the financial records are reasonably described
and-
(1) such customer has authorized such disclosure in accordance with...
[12 U.S.C. 3404];
(2) such financial records are disclosed in response to an administrative
subpena or summons which meets the requirements of... [12 U.S.C.
3405];(3) such financial records are disclosed in response to a search warrant
which meets the requirements of... [12 U.S.C. 3406];
(4) such financial records are disclosed in response to a judicial subpena
which meets the requirements of. . . [12 U.S.C. 3407]; or
(5) such financial records are disclosed in response to a formal written
request which meets the requirements of ... [12 U.S.C. 3408].
238. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3403(c), (d), 3413, 3414.
239. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3404, 3405, 3406, 3407, 3408.
240. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.
241. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c).
242. 12 U.S.C. § 3414.
243. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(a).
244. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(b).
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nue Code exception;2 4 the Federal statute and rule exception;2'
the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure or comparable
rules exception;247 the administrative subpoena exception;2' the
limited access law enforcement inquiry exception;249 the grand
jury exception;" the General Accounting Office exception;"
the Department of Treasury exception; 2 the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System exception;' and the Resolution
Trust Company exception.'
Given the numerous and accessible conditions and exceptions
to the RFPA permitting government access to customers' financial
records, coupled with the fact that the proposed wire transfer
regulations merely prescribe recordkeeping as opposed to reporting
requirements, the proposed wire transfer regulations do not appear
to run afoul of the RFPA. Nevertheless, the government must
comply with the terms of the RFPA before it will be permitted
access to customers' financial records.
C. Commentary
Since their announcement on August 31, 1993,25 the jointly
proposed enhanced recordkeeping requirements relating to
domestic and international wire transfers by certain financial
institutions have been the subject of great debate. Despite
concerns about the short implementation period, the cost of
reprogramming computer systems to handle increased recordkeep-
ing requirements, the expense of maintaining additional records,
the risks of overburdening a system whose viability depends upon
its speed and efficiency, and the overall usefulness of the record-
keeping requirements, initial feedback has been generally favor-
able. 6 Sources involved in the regulatory process are projecting
245. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(c).
246. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(d).
247. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(e).
248. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(0.
249. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(g).
250. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i).
251. 12 U.S.C. § 34130).
252. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(k).
253. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(m)..
254. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(n).
255. 58 Fed. Reg. 46014 (1994) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed
Aug. 31, 1994).
256. Robyn Meredith, Treasury Department Postpones Rule on Wire Transfers,
THE AM. BANKER, Dec. 30, 1993, at 14; Treasury and Federal Reserve Publish
Three Proposals on BSA Requirements, 61 BNA BANKING REPORT, Sept. 13,1993,
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that the joint proposal be implemented without substantive
change.5
7
Industry experts credit the fact that the proposed recordkeep-
ing requirements are significantly less onerous than previous
Treasury proposals." For example, the joint proposal stream-
lines previous proposals by allowing many of the records already
retained by affected financial institutions to substitute for additional
recordkeeping requirements. Of further significance is the
elimination of the highly criticized "on whose behalf" requirement,
the exemption of several large classes of funds transfers, and the
recognition that a significant portion of the required information
may already be retained for unrelated purposes!"9 Nonetheless,
the banking industry and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, Robert E. Powis, question the feasibility of the proposed
December 31, 1993 effective date for domestic and international
wire transfer recordkeeping requirements 6° They were correct!
Not long after their statements, the ABA asked the Secretary and
the Board to delay implementation of the joint proposal until it has
had a sufficient opportunity to ensure regulatory compliance.
The banking industry also expressed some reservation concern-
ing the anticipated compliance costs required by the joint propos-
al's enhanced recordkeeping storage and retrieval requirements.
261
According to some industry experts, even the largest banks with
their sophisticated automated computer systems, lack sufficient
storage capacity to ensure compliance with the enhanced record-
No. 9, at 372 [hereinafter Three Proposals]; New Wire Transfer Regs Receive
Lukewarm Welcome, 4 MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Sept. 1993, No.12 at 6; New
Wire Regs Bring With Them Large Costs, Little Time to Comply, 3 PRIVATE
PLACEMENT REPORTER, Aug. 30, No. 32 at Money Laundering Laws 1
[hereinafter New Wire Regs].
257. New Wire Regs, supra note 256, at 1; Fed and Treasury Draft New Rules
For International Wire Transfers; Enhanced Record Keeping Requirements Are Set
to Take Effect Dec. 31, 5 THOMSON'S INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATOR,
Aug. 30, 1993, No. 32, at 1 [hereinafter International Wire Transfers].
258. Wire Transfer Regs Look OK to Bankers at First Glance, XVII BANK
LETTER, Aug. 30, 1993, No. 34, at 4.
259. Long-Awaited Wire Transfer Rules Announced By Government, 4 MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Sept. 1993, No. 12, at 1.
260. 58 Fed. Reg. 46,024 (Aug. 31, 1993) (to-be codified at 12 C.F.R. part 219,
subpart B); 58 Fed. Reg. 46,614 (Aug. 31, 1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. part
103); New Wire Regs, supra note 256, at 1; New Wire Transfer Regs Receive
Lukewarm Welcome, supra note 256, at 6.
261. New Wire Transfer Regs Receive Lukewarm Welcome, supra note 256, at
6; New Wire Regs, supra note 256.
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keeping requirements.2 62 The President of Atchley Systems Inc.,
a Dallas based firm dealing with automated bank processing
systems, estimated that the total cost of putting together a
computer system capable of handling the massive amounts of
information required to be retained by a large bank under the
proposed regulations would cost at least $50,000.21 He further
projected that many of the smaller banks would lack the resources
needed to install an automated computer system and would
therefore be required to manually compile the required informa-
tion.2" In the words of another commentator, banks would be
required to "spend millions for information that may be used by
law enforcement five times a year."2" Along this line, John
Byrne commented that although the ABA "believe[s] these regs
represent a seemingly reasonable approach, that's not to say there
won't be costs and operational problems for larger institutions."2'
With respect to non-bank financial institutions, a former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of Treasury warned
that the enhanced recordkeeping requirements would "have a
devastating effect . . . unless some dollar threshold is set." 267 A
Western Union spokesperson noted that its system would require
a "complete overhaul" in order to comply with the proposed
regulations.26  To the contrary, the Florida Check Cashers
Association President, commented that he did not believe the new
regulations would have effect on his industry given the industry's
low volume and current practice of keeping required records.269
According to the Secretary and the Board's estimates, approxi-
mately 60,000 financial institutions would be affected by the joint
proposal, requiring approximately 8.5 million additional employee
hours per year to comply with the enhanced recordkeeping
requirements.27 These additional costs would be more than
offset by the facilitation of law enforcement efforts in tracing,
262. New Wire Regs, supra note 256, at 1; International Wire Transfers, supra
note 257.
263. New Wire Regs, supra note 256.
264. Id.
265. New Wire Transfer Regs Receive Lukewarm Welcome, supra note 256, at
6.
266. New Wire Regs, supra note 256.
267. New Wire Transfer Regs Receive Lukewarm Welcome, supra note 256, at
6.
268. Compliance with Wire Regs Will Cost Millions of Dollars, 4 MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Sept., 1993, No. 12, at 6.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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identifying, and prosecuting persons engaged in money laundering
activities, through the creation of a more complete and standard-
ized paper trail.271
VIII. Conclusion
It is important to recall that the United States awoke late to
the reality of world organized crime and political destabilization.
However, in 1970, the United States finally recognized the useful-
ness of imposing recordkeeping and reporting requirement upon
certain financial institutions.27 2 Through the preservation of an
evidentiary paper trail and the highlighting of highly suspicious
financial transactions, the government facilitated law enforcement
efforts of preserving the integrity of the nation's financial institu-
tions. 273 The predicate established in 1970 is now available for
realistic wire transfer controls. In the absence of wire transfer
recordkeeping and transmittal requirements, law enforcement
would be faced with the daunting task of unraveling the launderer's
web. The shakiest leg of law enforcement's stool is regulating the
banking industry itself - policing its operations and, above all, the
beneficial sources of its deposits.27  Yet, this is the only leg that
would seem to deny the international banking system to the drug
traffickers. 275
The new rules, required under the 1992 Annunzio-Wylie Anti-
Money Laundering Statute, represent a massive extension of the
current requirement to report cash transactions of $10,000 or
more.276  There are problems. The President of the Morely
Group stated that "Congress thought that, we'll keep more records,
so we'll detect more. But a trillion dollars a day [go] through New
York. We already have nine million cash transaction reports a year
that no one looks at., 277 Searching for patterns in the giant new
database, he added, would be "like looking for needles in hay-
271. Regs Benefit Enforcement Agencies, 4 MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Sept.,
1993, No. 12, at 6; Meredith, supra note 256, at 14; Three Proposals, supra note
256, at 372.
272. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970).
273. See Regs Benefit Enforcement Agencies, supra note 272,' at 6; Robyn
Meredith, Wire Transfer Rules Drawing Rave Reviews, THE AM. BANKER, Aug.
26, 1993, at 14; Three Proposals, supra note 256, at 372.
274. Andelnan, supra note 28.
275. Id.
276. See Feds Weigh Tough Wire-Transfer Reporting Rules, 19 CORPORATE
EFT REPORT, Oct. 5, 1994.
277. Id.
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stacks."'278 In the view of John Byrne, Senior Legislative Counsel
to the ABA, anti-money laundering initiatives should be directed
at the gateway to financial institutions as opposed to the streets in
which the funds travel inside:
[w]e've never believed wire transfer regulations were the
solution for money laundering. It is just the way the money
moves once someone has let their guard down and allowed the
money to enter the system .... In my opinion, the regulations
won't be a major tool for law enforcement.279
Conceptually, Byrne's perspective may very well be the better
one. After all, the money launderer's goal of obscuring the source
of illegitimate proceeds is furthered through the consummation of
a series of financial transactions within the financial institution. A
rational conclusion suggests that law enforcement efforts should
concentrate on preventing access to financial institutions, the tools
of the launderers' trade, as opposed to tracing the illegitimate
proceeds once they have been commingled with otherwise legiti-
mate proceeds. After all, most persons would agree that it is easier
to separate "East Coast Sand" from "West Coast Sand" when the
respective types of sand are separated into their respective sand
boxes than after they have been combined in the same box.
The pragmatist, although agreeing in principle, would contend
that Byrne's perspective is all well and good if only current anti-
money laundering initiatives were effective. However, just as law
enforcement efforts have been unable to prevent the back street
drug deals, they have also been unable to prevent the laundering
of illegitimate drug proceeds through legitimate United States
financial institutions. Thus, the pragmatist, perhaps correctly,
would argue that the realities of the situation necessitate the
implementation of additional enforcement mechanisms, e.g. the
proposed wire transfer regulations.
The ease at which launderers access United States financial
institutions, coupled with the speed and efficiency in which they
instantaneously move illegitimate funds from account to account,
within and among international financial institutions, through
domestic and international wire transfers, led at least one commen-
tator to conclude that wire transfers "have emerged as the primary
278. Id.
279. Compliance With Wire Regs Will Cost Millions of Dollars, 4 MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Sept. 1993, No.12, at 6.
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method by which high-volume money launderers ply their
trade." In the absence of wire transfer recordkeeping and
transmittal requirements, law enforcement will be faced with the
daunting task of unraveling the launderer's web.
The Department of Treasury and the Federal Reserve System
have taken the position that the information required to be
retained under the joint proposal would facilitate law enforcement
efforts in tracing, identifying, and prosecuting persons engaged in
money laundering activities." Ronald Noble, Treasury's Assis-
tant Secretary for Enforcement asserted that "the proposals reflect
Treasury's commitment to serv[ing] the needs of law enforcement
without imposing unnecessary burdens on the financial service
industry."'  While the Secretary and Board's goals are certainly
laudable, their cost-benefit estimates are somewhat suspect, perhaps
the product of mere speculation and desperation. Nevertheless,
such proposed recordkeeping and travel requirements should be
implemented, as only through such implementation, will their true
cost-benefits be realized.2"
Once the raw data is accumulated, how can it be transformed
into a format usable by law enforcement? A 'smart' software
would identify suspicious transactions using very little informa-
tion.' Software used in medical diagnosis to certify theories and
identify patterns from data appears to have promise.' A further
complication, however: the software must also be able to adapt to
changing patterns. 6  Laundering patterns change as, or before,
they are detected.'
With reporting requirements on the verge of becoming
streamlined, information should be more usable, enforcement
should be greater, and increased pressure on non-banks should also
occur. But, there still remain three key questions which the
government must consider: (1) Can the war on money laundering
ever be won as long as there is a demand for illegal goods and
services? (2) Can the war on money laundering ever be won
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without the full cooperation of the nation's financial institutions?
(3) If full cooperation is forthcoming, will the institutions suffer as
a large percentage of currency detours around the system? To
date, sadly, the flow of illicit funds into and out of the United
States continues unabated despite all of the best efforts of con-
cerned banks, non-bank financial institutions, and world-wide law
enforcement.
